2.27. This statement seems to echo the well known central digression in the Theaetetus (172c-177c) and hence refer to a Platonic tradition lato sensu, as well as to Aristotle (see Gerson [2004] , and with regard to the organization of the school, Natali [1991] ; as regards Theophrastus, see Bénatouïl's contribution in this volume). For an analysis of the concept of θεωρία within this tradition see-at least-Festugière (1936) and Nightingale (2004) ; and for an introduction to the di ferent positions with respect to the ideal of the contemplative life, see Jaeger (1948 Jaeger ( / 1928 Boll (1950); Grilli (1953); Joly (1956); Rausch (1982) . I would also cautiously refer to Redlow (1966) and Blumenberg (1987) .
-Sextus' reappraisal of the role of any possible contemplation/θεωρία that is linked to dogmatic philosophical claims; and, more particularly, his opposition to the contentions of the Stoics, including those of an ethical and practical order, and to their negative implications; -his delineation of a legitimate use of cognitive e forts which, whilst not attaining to any de nitive or absolute conclusion, will nonetheless allow for the construction of an alternative epistemological model; one that is capable of representing not only a satisfactory interaction in relation to the world, but also a 'theoretical' point of reference for our actions.
II
It will therefore rstly be necessary to seek out from within the Sextan corpus those passages in which the theoretical approach to reality becomesindirectly, but with a certain solidity-the objective of the Pyrrhonist critique. When moving in this direction, what becomes immediately evident is that Sextus' polemic grows sharper the moment he sets out to dismantle the eudaimonistic claims relating to the so-called 'art of living' or τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον.
Without ever directly addressing the question of the contemplative life construed as an end in itself-that can neither be superseded by other ends nor be functional to them-Sextus chooses to take issue with another notion, one that is not so much Platonic or Aristotelian as Hellenistic or post-Hellenistic: that of θεωρία, understood as the cognitive background to action which is correct, right, or good. In the eyes of the dogmatists (Sextus' polemical targets), a moral discourse that is productive of happiness can be counted legitimate if and only if it rests on strong theoretical conclusions regarding the nature of reality (on what a Sceptic would call 'nonevident/unclear objects', τὰ ἄδηλα), both on the ontological plane lato sensu and on that of the essence of true and absolute values or disvalues.
